The Nixon Administration

from of Oral History RoundtablesThe Nixon administration brought far-reaching changes to the National Security Council. Building on a strong mandate from (and a strong policy relationship with) the President, National Security Assistant Henry A. Kissinger achieved operational policy dominance greater than any predecessor or successor. His role and methods generated enormous controversy. They were also tied to substantial policy achievements: an opening to China, arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, and eventually an historic, albeit flawed, Vietnam peace accord. One means of gaining insight into how the Nixon NSC actually worked is to ask those who were there. This was the purpose of the Nixon NSC Oral History Roundtable, conducted on December 8, 1998, at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. Thirty years almost to the day after Kissinger and other Nixon transition planners developed a blueprint for a new system, we brought together a group of ten veteran practitioners and observers of American foreign policy who were directly involved in the Nixon process to share their recollections with us. The participants drew on their experiences as advisers in the Nixon transition; as members of President Nixon"s NSC staff; and as officials who dealt with the Nixon NSC from important vantage points in other agencies. For over three hours, they spoke informally about how and why the new system was established, how it operated, and how it evolved over time. The discussion confirmed much that is already in the public domain, but it also brought to light new facts and insights. We hope students of the Nixon administration and of the modern foreign policy process and its institutions will find it useful. I.M. "Mac" Destler is a Senior Fellow at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland. Ivo Daalder is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution

A Last Chance for Saddam Hussein

The New York TimesAs the Bush administration considers how to proceed on Iraq, it has to confront a growing contradiction in its public pronouncements. For months, President Bush has insisted that Baghdad allow United Nations inspectors complete and unfettered access to sites where they suspect weapons are being stored or produced. At the same time, American officials have made clear that Mr. Hussein's regime represents an unacceptable threat that must be removed, by force if necessary. But what if Mr. Hussein lets United Nations inspectors back in and gives them complete access? Would the administration still insist on his removal? Yes, according to Secretary of State Colin Powell. "Even then," he told CNN last month, "the United States believes the Iraqi people would still be better off with a new kind of leadership that is not trying to hide this sort of development activity on weapons of mass destruction and is not of the despotic nature that the Saddam Hussein regime is." Recently, President Bush was even more direct in putting the focus on Saddam Hussein himself, rather than on his weapons. "He is a problem," Mr. Bush said, "and we're going to deal with him." Elisa D. Harris is a Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland. Ivo H. Daalder is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution

What's Missing?

San Jose Mercury NewsLast week, the chief U.S. weapons inspector in Iraq reported that, like his U.N counterparts before the war, he had not uncovered Iraqi stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction or active weapons production efforts inside the country. David Kay and the 1,400 members of his investigative team may yet find the weapons stocks the Bush administration said were sure to be there. But such discoveries are increasingly unlikely. The gap between President Bush's warnings and Kay's preliminary findings raises at least three important questions as the United States shapes its policy toward the weapons programs of North Korea, Iran and other countries: How reliable is U.S. intelligence on foreign weapons programs? Can sanctions and inspections play a useful role in containing the threat from such programs? And are pre-emptive attacks the most effective way to deal with such threats? Elisa D. Harris is a senior research scholar at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland. Ivo H. Daalder was a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, is co-author of the just-released "America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy.

Intelligence within BAOR and NATO's Northern Army Group

During the Cold War the UK's principal military role was its commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) through the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR), together with wartime command of NATO's Northern Army Group. The possibility of a surprise attack by the numerically superior Warsaw Pact forces ensured that great importance was attached to intelligence, warning and rapid mobilisation. As yet we know very little about the intelligence dimension of BAOR and its interface with NATO allies. This article attempts to address these neglected issues, ending with the impact of the 1973 Yom Kippur War upon NATO thinking about warning and surprise in the mid-1970s. It concludes that the arrangements made by Whitehall for support to BAOR from national assets during crisis or transition to war were - at best - improbable. Accordingly, over the years, BAOR developed its own unique assets in the realm of both intelligence collection and special operations in order to prepare for the possible outbreak of conflict

European Union Approaches to Human Rights Violations in Kosovo before and after Independence

This article examines European Union (EU) approaches to the question of human rights violations in Kosovo before and after its proclamation of independence, in February 2008. While the 1999 NATO-led humanitarian intervention in the region was often justified as necessary due to the continuous abuses of human rights, perpetrated by the Serbian forces against the ethic Kosovo Albanians, the post-interventionist period has witnessed a dramatic reversal of roles, with the rights of the remaining Serbian minority being regularly abused by the dominant Albanian population. However, in contrast to the former scenario, the Brussels administration has remained quite salient about the post-independence context – a grey zone of unviable political and social components, capable of generating new confrontations and human rights abuses within the borders of Kosovo. Aware of this dynamic and the existing EU official rhetoric, it is possible to conclude that the embedded human rights concerns in Kosovo are not likely to disappear, but even more importantly, their relevance has been significantly eroded

Bush the transnationalist: a reappraisal of the unilateralist impulse in US foreign policy, 2001-2009

This article challenges the common characterisation of George W. Bush’s foreign policy as “unilateral.” It argues that the Bush administration developed a new post-9/11 understanding of terrorism as a transnational, networked phenomenon shaped by the forces of globalisation. This led to a new strategic emphasis on bi- and multilateral security co-operation and counterterrorism operations, especially outside of Afghanistan and Iraq, driven by the perceived need to counter a transnational security challenge present in multiple locations. This (flawed) attempt to engage with transnational security challenges supplemented the existing internationalist pillar of the Bush administration’s foreign policy. Highlighting the transnational realm of international relations and the ways in which the Bush administration was able to co-opt other states to tackle perceived transnational challenges also shows the high importance the administration attached to concerted action even as it frequented eschewed institutional multilateralism